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In the early Tang dynasty, Buddhism found itself in difficult circumstances. The Daoist clergy 
had given its support to the dynasty’s rise to power, and hence was employed to formulate an 
ideology legitimizing the new dynasty’s rule. Through the close co-operation of the early 
Tang dynasty with the Daoist clergy, the Daoist priest Fu Yi 傅奕 (555-639) obtained an 
influential position at court. He used this influence in order to agitate against Buddhism, and 
handed in petitions requesting the expulsion of Buddhism from China. Through him also his 
devotees Li Zhongqing 李仲卿 und Liu Jinxi 劉進喜 handed in petitions of similar content to 
the throne. The central point in the anti-Buddhist agitation brought forward by the three of 
them was that Buddhism, as a teaching coming from Barbarian lands outside of China, did not 
match the Chinese concept of social order and impaired the political stability of the Chinese 
empire. The main spokesman of Buddhism attempting to defend the sagha against this anti-
Buddhist agitation was Falin 法琳 (572-640). With his Poxie lun 破邪論 (T 2109) and his 
Bianzheng lun 辯正論 (T 2110) he authored two major apologetic treatises. The Poxie lun 
was designed as a reply to Fu Yi, and the Bianzheng lun as a reply to Li Zhongqing and Liu 
Jinxi.  
 In my Falin monograph I have analysed Poxie lun and Bianzheng lun with regard to 
their argumentation strategy. No strategy is immediately obvious, as both treatises are largely 
designed in dialogic shape rather than in terms of progressive argumentation. However, if 
looking at Falin’s apologetic treatises from a bird’s eye perspective, particular lines of 
argumentation do become clearly discernible. Falin’s main objective was to demonstrate that 
the Tang dynasty, in its struggles for consolidation of its rule, would in fact be served better 
by Buddhism than by Daoism. In my interpretation, Falin’s argumentation strategy comprises 
three aspects all of which contribute to this main objective.  
 As in the Chinese tradition civil order was generally organized on the basis of 
Confucianism, other teachings being presented as further utilities in the stabilization of state 
and society needed to be in harmony with Confucianism. Hence, the first aspect of Falin’s 
apologetic argumentation strategy is to demonstrate that Buddhism, even though having come 
to China from abroad, was in perfect harmony with the Confucian approach to ordering the 
empire. In order to show that Buddhism shares the doctrinal origins of Confucianism, Falin 
claims that Buddhism had been part of the so-called golden age of Chinese antiquity. Falin 
substantiates this claim mainly through legends regarding Aśoka and Manjuśrī: First, 
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messengers of Emperor Aśoka distributing the Buddha relics all over the world were said to 
have reached China already during the earliest antiquity. Secondly, Bodhisattva Manjuśrī was 
said to have manifested himself in the Himālaya exercising influence on ancient China. These 
legends were designed, to make the Confucian concept of the ideal ruler, allegedly designed 
by the Confucian sages of Chinese antiquity, a shared heritage of both Confucianism and 
Buddhism. As far as the approach to civil order is concerned, Falin points to the congruence 
between the five Buddhist śīlas and the five Confucian cardinal virtues. On this basis he 
argues that the moral commandments through which Confucianism orders the society would 
have their perfectly equivalent counterpart in Buddhism. Another argument Falin presents 
regarding the compatibility of Buddhist and Confucian ethics refers to the Confucian moral 
requirement of filial piety (chin.: xiao, 孝). Buddhism had frequently been criticized for 
disregarding this requirement, as in order to enter the sagha one had to leave the family. In 
reply to this criticism, Falin stresses that the act of entering the sagha would in fact be the 
greatest expression of filial piety, since monks and nuns in their spiritual efforts would work 
towards the ultimate well-being of all living beings including their parents.  
 However in depicting Buddhism as being in agreement with Confucianism, Falin could 
not go as far as portraying Buddhism as a mere resemblance of the Confucian system. 
Emphasizing the relevance of Buddhism, Falin in the second aspect of his argumentation 
strategy argues that in history Confucianism had failed in putting its ideals of civil order into 
practice, and that Buddhism would be needed to practically impose those ideals. Going 
through the historical records regarding Chinese antiquity, Falin demonstrates that the 
Confucian sage rulers had not been able to maintain the state of “Great Peace” 太平 
continuously, but frequently saw it interrupted by all sorts of warfare. Having revealed the 
weaknesses of the Confucian sages in this way, Falin goes on to argue that the only real sage 
would be the Buddha. In this respect he employs the famous passage from Liezi 列子, chapter 
4, rendering a dialogue in which Confucius admits that none of the Confucian sages would be 
real sages and concludes by saying that there would be a real sage in the Western territories. 
In Falin’s apologetic treatises this sage of the Western territories is of course seen as the 
Buddha. 
 In the third aspect of his argumentation strategy, Falin shows that Buddhism has the 
advantage over Daoism. He compares Laozi to the Buddha and stresses the Buddha’s 
superiority. He could however not take his criticism of Laozi too far, since the Tang ruling 
house, within its dynastic legitimation propaganda, traced its own pedigree back to Laozi, and 
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revered him as the “imperial ancestor”. Hence Falin accepts the teaching of Laozi (i.e. the 
Daode jing) as being authentic, and directs his criticism mainly against religious Daoism 
(known as the daojiao 道教). He depicts the daojiao as a perverted transformation of Daoism 
not being based on the teachings of Laozi any more. At great length Falin discusses and 
ridicules all the immortality and longevity practices of religious Daoism also pointing to their 
sexo-yogic implications. He presents all of this as one big system of delusion and debauchery. 
Falin says that, as the contents of the daojiao appear to be wantonly invented, Daoism would 
be legitimate only in the teachings of Laozi and Zhuangzi (known as the daojia 道家). Hence 
he can conclude that Daoism would be legitimate only as a jia and not as a jiao. As he 
explains, Buddhism and Confucianism are both jiao, while Daoism only being legitimate as a 
jia could not stand on that same level. In discrediting the daojiao as a teaching inadequate to 
promote the stabilization of political power, Falin, apart from stressing its doctrinal 
illegitimacy, also points to its potentially subversive character. In great detail he goes through 
the history of riots that arose from circles affiliated to the Daojiao. Most important here is the 
riot of the Yellow turbans which indirectly caused the fall of the Eastern Han dynasty. 
Throughout his treatises, Falin comes back to the Yellow Turbans again and again. But he 
also mentions many other riots that had their roots in Daoist circles.  
 With regard to each of these three aspects, Falin took over many arguments developed 
in previous Chinese Buddhist apologetic thought. Already in Nanbeichao times, Buddhist 
apologists had attempted to present Buddhism as a teaching able to assist the ruler in 
stabilizing his rule. Hence, even though apologists were writing in different historical contexts, 
the basic intention of presenting Buddhism as a utility in the stabilization of civil order and as 
being superior to Daoism remained the same. As there was this consistency in the general 
approach to apologetic writing, certain core arguments keep re-appearing in various Buddhist 
apologetic texts and were finally employed in Falin’s treatises as well. I have to confine 
myself to just naming two examples of what Falin took over from previous apologetic thought: 
First, the idea of the equivalence between the Buddhist śīlas and the Confucian cardinal 
virtues had previously been developed in the apocryphon Tiwei boli jing 提謂波利經, the 
Sūtra of Trapua and Bhallika. Secondly, the argument of Buddhism and Confucianism being 
jiao, while Daoism would be a jia only, goes back to the Erjiao lun 二教論, the “Treatise on 
the Two Jiao”.  
 It seems that Falin had little success in winning imperial sympathy for Buddhism. The 
Daoist monk Qin Shiying 秦世英 accused Falin at court for having disparaged Laozi. Falin 
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was officially interrogated and finally sent into banishment. The importance of Falin’s 
apologetic work is however not to be sought in his effect on politics, but rather in his 
contribution to the history of ideas. Taken together, Poxie lun and Bianzheng lun form by far 
the most complex work in the history of Chinese Buddhist apologetic thought up to Falin’s 
lifetime. Falin brings together apologetic arguments from many different sources. He 
assembles the core arguments not only of apologetic scriptures and apocrypha. Pointing to the 
conversion of previous Chinese rulers to Buddhism, he also quotes sources such as the 
Gaoseng zhuan 高僧傳 (T 2059), the Weishu Shilao zhi 魏書釋老志, and the Buddhist 
forgery of the Wushu 吳書 replacing the lost original compiled by Wei Zhao 韋昭 (204-273). 
Hence Falin’s apologetic work is to be seen as a huge compendium on the one hand summing 
up what Chinese Buddhist apologetic thought had to offer, and on the other hand adding new 
arguments in many respects.  
 Due to Falin’s importance for Buddhist apologetic thought, Falin was generously 
received in Buddhist historiography. Buddhist historiographers glorified him as a bodhisattva 
of apologetic thought, hoping to give his words even more weight. Apart from his biography 
in Xu gaoseng zhuan 續高僧傳 (T 2060), juan 24, Falin has an independent biography in 
three juan entitled Falin biezhuan 法琳別傳 (T 2051), and he also appears as representing 
Buddhism in several of the debates in juan 3 of the Fodao lunheng 佛道論衡 (T 2104). 
Especially the Falin biezhuan and the Fodao lunheng are also valuable as sources offering 
further insights into Falin’s apologetic argumentation.  
 In the revised and enlarged edition of my Falin monograph which will appear in three 
volumes before the end of 2013, I translate the most important parts of Poxie lun and 
Bianzheng lun as well as all the aforementioned sources of Buddhist historiography 
documenting both life and thought of Falin. 
Thank you very much for your attention! 
